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FINANCIAL STRUCTURE AND SYSTEMIC RISK: EVIDENCE FROM SELECTED
MENA REGION COUNTRIES
Abstract
Against the context of the consecutive world financial crisis, this paper aims to evaluates the merits of
market-based against bank-based financing by analyzing the correlation between financial structure and
systemic risk of eleven countries within the MENA region. Within the study three hypotheses are tested;
first, if financial structure and systemic risk are significantly related, second, if this relation is non-linear
relationship and the third one is if bank financing doesn’t contribute to systemic risk above the threshold
financial structure value. To our knowledge no paper has addressed this issue in the selected countries.
This paper uses a balanced panel of 253 observations for the period between 1995 and 2018 to perform
the empirical analysis. Our results from the fixed effect panel regression, confirm that this relation is
significant between financial structure and systemic risk, supports a non-linear relationship and has an
inflection point as proved by the cubic model regression. In light of these results, stock-markets are more
resilient to systemic risk and non-interest income activities offered by the banks are considered to be a
source of risk.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Both the financial intermediaries and the financial market play an instrumental role within
the financial system. Both are considered to be essential for economic growth due to their capacity
to stabilize the financial system through reinforcing diversity and improving resource allocation
(Beck & Levine, 2004). Moreover, it has been recognized that countries with efficient financial
systems have experienced increased economic development (Levine, 2005). However, despite
this, the financial system is prone to systemic risks which in turn pose threats of a possible financial
crisis.
It has been noted that financial markets and intermediaries are considered to be fragile in
their nature and have historically contributed to speculative bubbles and failures. This is
demonstrated when a “shock” has the potential to facilitate a contagion effect and as a result
destabilizes the financial system, domestically or internationally. In turn, these crises had and still
have a negative and substantial impact on the development of the financial sector and thus
economic growth.
Various economists have expressed concerns in regards to the stability of the financial
system with emphasis on risks generated through financial system participants, particularly on
banks, stocks and bond markets (Taylor, 2009). Although a comprehensive theory related to
systemic risks does not currently exist, there are various theories including agency, legitimacy,
proprietary costs and resource dependence which give forth to the explanation of the impact of the
financial system on the level of systemic risk.
Moreover, there is scarce empirical research which addresses the relationship between the
financial structure and systemic risk (Bats and Houben, 2020). Suggestions made by analysts
assume that the normal state of the financial system is not to exhibit such instabilities. Once
something emerges and in turn triggers a change in the way markets or banks interact with each
other, this essentially leads to a shift in the system from a stable to an unstable state. Furthermore,
once the system surpasses a threshold that pushes it into instability a much wider range of
outcomes become possible, including some that have unfavorable consequences for the wider
economy (Schiavo, 2016 and Kemp, 2017). Therefore, how this relationship is formed is still
considered to be inconclusive.
Even though economists and theorists argue that a diversified financial system has the
potential to reduce the impact of a liquidity crunch and in turn promote swift recovery
(Duisenberg, 2001), such debates prove to provide no middle ground as a result of the minimal
research which has been published in the field.
It was apparent that in the Middle East and North African (MENA) region, much of the
financial progress which was exhibited by the banking sector was also followed by equities
(despite it being underdeveloped) and then by government bonds (Hamadi and Bassil, 2015). In
depth, it is both the prominent role of government as well as the banks control over the financial
system which are considered to be obstacles in regards to the development of the market system
and the financial system as a whole, this is a critical reason for the financial system instability
(Levine, 2005 and Taylor, 2009). The aim of this study is to test the hypotheses which intend to
investigate the relationship between both the financial structure and systemic risk through the
employment of panel data from the MENA region. The paper is structured as follows: section two
is the literature review, section three is the presentation of both the methodology and data, section
four is the discussion of the empirical results, and finally the conclusion is presented in section
five.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
According to Allan and Gale (2001), the historical events of the Mississippi Bubble (France,
1917) and the South Sea Bubble (England, 1911) were fundamental in shaping contemporary
financial systems and the different long-term proceedings in the two countries brought forth the
development of two distinctly different types of financial based systems. This was in line with
what was proposed by Levine, who split the diversification of the financial system into two based
systems: market- based and bank- based. Despite this distinction, both have the potential to lead
to economic growth (Levine, 2002).

The bank-based system is when banks play a leading role and serve a base for economic
development, and facilitate the execution of transactions (Goldsmith, 1969 and Levine, 2005).
While a market-based system depends on the financial market. Some studies suggest that a welldeveloped stock market would implement an efficient allocation of resources which in turn lead
to high economic expansion and economic growth through the innovation of products and services
(Majid, 2007 and Enisan and Olufisayo, 2009). Thus, this separation serves as a necessary
comparison between these two types of bodies and them being a systemic risk contributor.
Systemic risk is defined as the risks associated with the collapse of a financial institution,
markets or even entire economies and the geographical reach can be regional, national or
international. Essentially, it is composed of two important stages; idiosyncratic or systematic
shocks and propagation mechanism or spill-over impact. This is in line with the definition by
Cummins & Weiss (2014), who identified systemic risk as a contagious risk which causes a loss
of economic value or trust in a substantial segment of the financial system and also has a high
possibility to catalyze harmful effects on the real economy.
To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, the only paper which has investigated the impact
of financial structure on systemic risk was conducted by Bats and Houben (2020). This study
integrated a panel data of 22 OECD countries and it was concluded that market-based countries
are linked with lower systemic risk than bank-based countries. Accordingly, there are various
propagation chains in the banking and financial markets which must be probed into further.

2.1 Systemic Risk within the Banking Sector
Banks have been considered to be at the center of financial activities, such as; taking
deposits, granting loans as well as equity securities and underwriting debt. In spite of their
share of financial intermediation being reduced through growth of capital markets and mutual
funds they are still considered to play a pivotal role in the financial sector.
With time, economic forces have led to financial innovations which have increased the
level of competition in financial markets. Consequently, traditional banking has lost
profitability, and banks have begun to diversify into new activities such as non-interest income
which may result in higher returns.
The correlation between these non-interest income activities and systemic risk has not
been considered to be conclusive within any empirical studies. Researchers such as De Young
and Torna (2013) and Engle et al. (2014), have suggested that they are not positively correlated,
while others such as Sedunov (2016) have noted that certain implementations have naturally
resulted in an increased systemic risk contribution. In addition, there are certain factors which
give rise to systemic risks within the banking system such as; size, idiosyncratic risk, leverage,
common risk exposure and global activity (Walter, 2011and Schwerter, 2011)
It is important to note that bank stability is positively correlated with its lending behavior.
When market activity fosters greater economic growth, banks generate more profit (via net
worth) and in turn are able to lend borrowers more money. However, should a failure occur,
the increased lending pattern could potentially result in great risks. Besides, banks are very
dependent on other banks as intermediaries for various functions, such as the distribution of
liquefied assets to banks that are at loss or in a deficit (Bruche and Suarez, 2010). As a result,
they are interconnected with one another and this interconnection may predict losses
(Drehmann and Tarashev, 2013).
Conversely, this interconnectedness has the potential to lead to increased market
concentration and in turn restricts competition. This is problematic as a reduction in
competition leads to larger loans, higher probability of failure and less credit rationing if loans
are subjected to multiplicative uncertainty (Caminal and Matutes, 2002). Irresberger et al.
(2017) propose that the systemic risk contribution intensifies as bank size grows, hence the
“too-big-to-fail” notion.
Moreover, not only does systemic risk increase with bank size it also decreases with
capital ratio (Laeven et al. 2016). Gai et al. (2011) have analyzed the influence of financial
networks' degree of complexity and concentration on systemic risk. They contest that network
interconnectedness and complexity increase systemic risk, while macro-prudential regulations
and strict liquidity policies can improve a network's ability to protect it against potential risk.
Therefore, this interconnection may seriously cause financial instability that will trigger
systemic risk which essentially leads to a financial crisis (Brunnermeier, 2009).

2.2 Systemic Risks in Financial Markets
Within the last two decades not only have financial markets significantly evolved, but
their role has also come to be considered the most complex element in the analysis of systemic
risk. This is as a result of their significant growth within the last decade in countries were banks
were considered to provide more than 20% of the cooperate financing within its respective
economy (bank-based countries). Moreover, their role in systemic events hasn’t really been
explored in a systematic manner and that theoretical models which focus on market contagion
are particularly scarce.
Since the nature of financial markets are different from financial institutions, there isn’t
potential for them to experience bankruptcy and their primary focus is then on the “shocks”
related to a market price volatility or temporary liquidity crises, be they contagious or not. In
case they are contagious, they may lead to a “pseudo financial crises” or burst of a bubble
(Schwartz, 1987 and Bordo et al.,1998).
As suggested by Sornette (2003) a bubble is considered to be a “period of time going
from a pronounced minimum to a large maximum through prolonged price acceleration which
is followed by a crash or a large decrease” (p.286); moreover, whilst each bubble is considered
to have its own set of specific features, they do share general global characteristics. The
developmental stages of a bubble begin with it starting smoothly with an increase of production
and sale in a relatively optimistic market, which is then followed by an attraction to investments
with good potential gain and that essentially leads to increased investments, possibly with
leverage being derived from novel sources. Then price appreciation which is followed by the
attraction of less sophisticated investors and in turn leveraging is further developed with minor
down-payments (which have small margins) and this leads to demand for stock increasing
quicker than the rate at which real money is put in the market. By this stage, the market’s
behavior becomes weakly coupled or practically uncoupled from real wealth (industrial and
services) production. As prices skyrocket, the number of new investors joining the speculative
market declines and the market gets in a phase of larger nervousness, until instability is revealed
and the market collapses (Sornette, 2017).
It should be emphasized that in “bubbles” and “crashes” are considered to be significant
events in economics and various factors drive their formation such as political, economic,
technological and psychological aspects (Shiller, 2005). Moreover, Shiller (2005) identified
various precipitating factors which form the skin of a bubble which include; new information
technology, cultural and political changes favoring business success, supportive monetary
policy, the capitalist explosion and the ownership society, the growth of mutual funds, an
expansion in media reporting of business news, analysts’ optimistic forecasts, and the decrease
in inflation and the outcomes of money illusion, and the increase of gambling opportunities.
Not only are the cross-asset market price propagations considered to be a problem within
the financial market, but the issue of asymmetric information problem may also arise (Vogel,
2018). This phenomenon illustrates how a financial predicament can accumulate over an
extended period of time before any inefficient/efficient crisis occurs, in other words the
systemic event is the outcome of a more fundamental underlying problem. An example of this
would be when stock prices may have stayed overvalued for an extended period until eventually
certain news bursts the bubble.
Based on the previously mentioned arguments, the researcher purposed the following
hypotheses:
H1: Financial structure and systemic risk are negatively related.
H2: The relationship between financial structure and economic growth is a non-monotonic
relationship.
H3: The impacts of a different financial structure on systemic risk may depend on the degree
of bank financing in that financial structure.

3. METHODOLOGY AND DATA
The methodology of this study consists of two statistical specifications and several
equations. Essentially there will be a linear and nonlinear statistical specification. Under these two
specifications different econometric techniques are used: fixed effect for linear estimation whereas
cubic model and threshold regression were used to test the non-linear relationship.

3.1 Linear Estimation
The benchmark model in this study will be a modified version of a model constructed by
Bats and Houben (2020). The baseline risk model is based on the linear relationship
between the financial structure and systemic risk equation:
𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1 𝑁𝐹𝑆𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑁𝐼𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐶𝑁𝑗,𝑡 + µ𝑗 + η𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡

-

(1)
Subscript (j) represents each unit of analysis i.e. country, j ϵ {1,…11}.
Subscript (t) represents the time period, t ϵ {1,….23}.
α is a constant variable
β is the regression coefficients
RISKit, the dependent variable, is assigned for the country credit rating for a country chosen
under variable j and t for the time period.
NFSj, represents the financial structure indicator
NIj,𝑡 represents the banks’ noninterest income
CNj,𝑡 represents the banking concentration
𝑢j represents the unobserved country-specific factors
ηt represents the unobserved time–invariant
εj,t is the error term.

3.2 Non-Linear Estimations
Under the non-linear regression two different estimation techniques are used to test the
remaining two hypotheses, respectively. The first is the cubic model and its results will be
illustrated graphically to see the inflection point of the curve, whilst the second will be a panel
threshold model.
The cubic model equation will be written as the following:
𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1 𝑁𝐹𝑆𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑁𝐹𝑆 2𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑁𝐹𝑆 3𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑁𝐼𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝐶𝑁𝑗,𝑡 + µ𝑗 + η𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡

(2)
Finally, after confirming the nonlinear relationship panel between financial structure and
systemic risk, a threshold regression is applied. The results that are derived are based on the
threshold view which should essentially provide additional insight on the behavior of the banks
and stock markets and how potential levels of systemic risk are considered to be direct signals
of an upcoming crisis. The coefficients “𝛽j,t” for each variable are estimated independently to
indicate the impact below and above the estimated thresholds, this threshold value is a financial
structure variable and calculated by the statistical software STATA based on Hansen’s (1996)
bootstrap procedure.
𝐿𝑛(𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑗,𝑡 ) =
𝛼0 + 𝛽1 𝐵𝐾𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐷𝑀𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑆𝑀𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐶𝑁𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝑁𝐼𝑗,𝑡 + µ𝑗 + η𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡 , 𝑁𝐹𝑆𝑗,𝑡 ≤ λ
{
𝛼0 + 𝛽1 𝐵𝐾𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐷𝑀𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑆𝑀𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐶𝑁𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝑁𝐼𝑗,𝑡 + µ𝑗 + η𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡 , 𝑁𝐹𝑆𝑗,𝑡 > λ

(3)

This study derived data from eleven countries within the MENA region which include:
Egypt, Jordan, Kingdom of Bahrain, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
Tunisia and the United Arab Emirates. It is important to note that these countries were selected
based on the availability of stock market and bank credit data and they are not currently in the
midst of any war or military confrontation. In respect to the empirical analysis, a balance panel
of annual observations between the periods starting from 1995 to 2018 were utilized. This time
frame was selected due to their being an abundance in the number of observations available.
The assessment of systemic risk is considered to be considerably challenging due to its
large scale and the fact that it is composed of various contributors. With respect to this study,
It was concluded that the sovereign credit rating is considered to be the best measure of
systemic risk and the three major credit rating agencies that were used consisted of: Fitch
IBCA, Moody’s Investor Service, and Standard and Poor’s (S&P) which list numerous social,
economic and political factors that underlie their sovereign credit ratings. Despite the fact all

three of the agencies work in correspondence with each other, the rating of the qualitative codes
is done differently. In regards to the qualitative codes, they will be transferred into quantitative
numbers using a linear transformation tool coined by Cantor and Packer in 1996. In addition
to the qualitative codes, the three agencies used both “Outlook” and “Credit Watch” tools that
provide signals which cause permanent changes to the market for the likelihood of possible
imminent upgrades or downgrades. In this context, they must be taken into consideration and
to be quantitively transferred by following the work of Monfort and Mulder (2001).
Within the study, the variable of interest is considered to be the financial structure
indicator “NFS”, this is estimated using the following three variables: the first is the domestic
credit to private sector by banks (% GDP) which was obtained from the World Bank’s Global
Financial Development Database (GFDD) and the remaining two which represents the
financial markets: Market capitalization (% GDP) which was retrieved from PASSPORT
database, and the non-financial debt market (% GDP) which was derived from the Bank for
International Settlements (BIS). The NFS is calculated by dividing the first variable over the
sum of the two remaining variables.
In regards to the control variables, the data related to the concentration percentages of
the bank assets held by the top three banks and governmental debt (as percentages) was
obtained from the Global Economy database. Moreover, Bankscope, Bureay van Dijk (Bvd)
were used to collect the non-interest income to total income percentage of these banks.

4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
The descriptive statics will provide a summary of the dataset regarding the mean,
standard deviations, and variable abbreviations of the 253 observations used form the period
starting from 1995 to 2018, as shown in Table 1. It also reports the characteristics of these
variables, as well the abbreviation of each variable. The table reveals the presence of a
significant heterogeneity within countries in all variables, which is shown in the large
magnitude between the variable’s minimum value and its maximum value. These large
variations within the variables are due to the different developments in the financial sector
within the countries integrated in this study.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Data (253 Observation)

Variable

Variable
Abbreviation

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Country sovereign credit rating

RISK

59.862

19.439

20

90

Financial structure indicator

NFS

0.621

.376

.188

3.37

Domestic credit to private sector by banks (%
GDP)

BK

54.921

19.033

20.792 105.84

Non-financial debt market capitalization (% of
GDP)
Market capitalization of listed domestic
companies (% of GDP)

DM

54.298

42.24

1.6

183

SM

55.905

38.971

6.926

238.674

Banks’ noninterest income

NI

32.401

9.194

13.51

61.76

Bank concentration

CN

65.585

16

34.66

93.13

4.2 The Diagnostic Tests Results
To begin with, the stationarity process of the variables was examined through the unit
root test utilizing the Augmented Dickey- Fuller (ADF). After proceeding with the ADF for
each variable series, the outcomes of these tests did in fact confirm that all series are stationary.
Once the Hausman test was implemented, the fixed effect was considered to be more
appropriate than a random effect at a significant p-value of 10% (by rejecting the null
hypothesis) since the equation displays a p-value equal to 0.09 (table 2).

Table 2: Hausman Test Results

Next, testing for heteroscedasticity is undertaken using the Breusche-Pagan test. After
the test was conducted it was confirmed that heteroscedasticity was identified within the
equation and that it displayed a p-value of 0.2 which is greater than 0.1 in turn resulting in the
rejection of the null hypothesis (table 3). It should be noted that the heteroscedasticity
predicament was corrected using the robust standard error performed by STATA software.
Table 3: Heteroskedasticity Test Results

4.3 Linear analysis
Table 4 demonstrates the results of model 1 which indicates a significant relationship
between both financial structure and systemic risk. It was identified that NFS decreases the
possibility of systemic risk at a 1% significance level since the coefficient value of NFS
registered a value of 5.079 which reflects an increase in the country credit rating; subsequently,
systemic risk decreases once this rating increases. Moreover, bank based financial structures
are associated with lower systemic risk whilst market based financial structures are associated
with higher systemic risk. Such results deeply contrasted with findings of both Bats and
Houben, (2020).

In regards to the control variables, it is important to note that banking sector
concentration is not significant while the noninterest income is positively significant at 10%.
In addition, the banks’ noninterest income results support the literature in which nontraditional
banking activities don’t generate systemic risks (DeYoung and Torna, 2013 and Engle et al.,
2014). Finally, through checking the model’s significance it was confirmed that the overall
regression is highly significant by the value of F-statistic, relatedly the R-squared was equal to
85%.
Table 4: The Linear Relationship between Financial Structure and Systemic Risk (model 1)

4.4 Nonlinear analysis
Based on the second hypothesis, the nature of the relationship between both the NFS and
systemic risk is examined to identify whether the relationship is either linear or non-linear.
Table 5 includes the regression outcomes of model two. The aim of this estimation is not to
identify the value of the coefficient, rather it is to identify the significant relationship (between
the NFS and systemic risk) in order to confirm the usage of the panel threshold regression, or
not, and the coefficient signs which reflect the relationship’s convexity. The outcomes which
emerged suggests that the squared and cubic term of the NFS measurements are statistically
significant at a 1% level, the output also implies that a cubic relationship is apparent between
both the NFS and systemic risk and finally the coefficients signs show that the relationship is
concave in its nature.
Table 5: The Cubic Relationship between Financial Structure and Systemic Risk (model 2)

In the below figure, the vertical axis represents the systemic risk measure whilst the
horizontal axis indicates the financial structure measurement. Additionally, figure 1 reveals
that, in terms of systemic risk, countries are likely to benefit from increased levels of stock
market and debt market financing as long as the NFS remains below 0.7 and theoretically
doesn’t exceed 1.0. Yet, as shown in figure 1, the likelihood of systemic risks increases after it
exceeds 0.7, and this is denoted by the red line. In addition, this implies that a threshold exists
beyond the effect of the financial structure on systemic risk.

As a result, there is the presence of various inflection points and these are considered to
be threshold values which are calculated in the next subsection using Hansen’s Bootstrap
procedure (1996).

Fig.1: The Cubic Relationship between Financial Structure and Systemic Risk

The third hypothesis is tested using the panel threshold regression represented by model
3. The output of this model is presented in table 6 and presents the structural break model in
which the first section, regime 1, presents the coefficients value of estimation in the first row
of each variable and are considered to be below the threshold. In the second section, regime 2,
the first row of each variable is considered to be the coefficient value of estimation and are
above the threshold. Whereas, the standard error of each variable is shown in the second row
in regime 1 and regime 2. The results obtained from the Hansen F-test (1999) showed a
bootstrap p-value at 0.002 < 0.010, which in turn caused the rejection of the null hypothesis
which claims that no threshold effect. Furthermore, the F-test detected a “break” in the data as
well as the NFS threshold value being at 0.4788 which is symbolized by the “λ” sign.
It is important to note that when the λ is below/equal to 0.4788, it is essentially an
indication of the fact that bank financing doesn’t affect systemic risk. However, the control
variables which reflect the banking sector displayed different results in which the bank’s noninterest income is positively significant at a 5% level, whereas the bank concentration is not
considered to be significant. In any case, when the λ is above 0.4788, the relationship between
bank financing and systemic risk is still insignificant. In regards to the first control variable,
the bank’s non-interest income is considered to be negatively significant at a 1% level, which
suggests that the banking sector will decrease the credit rating. Based on these findings it can
be concluded that the non-interest income that banks are providing increases systemic risk
beyond the threshold point, including those transactions which are yet to be covered by laws
and regulations. This notion contrasts deeply with the finding of Bats and Houben (2020) which
state that bank credit has the potential to increase systemic risk below the threshold value and
in turn has no impact should it go beyond the threshold. Similarly, in regards to the bank’s noninterest income, it was found that it had no impact on systemic risk below and above the
threshold. It should be noted that the main difference between this study and the one conducted
by Bats and Houben is the development of the financial systems of the sampled countries.
In contrast, financing through a non-financial market has a significantly negative impact
on the credit rating above and below the threshold value of 1% significance level, therefore;
non-financial debt financing has the potential to increase the level of systemic risk. In regards
to stock market financing, systemic risk is considered to be insignificant below the threshold
and significant above the threshold at 5% significance level.

Table 6: The Impacts of Financing Indicators on Systemic Risk above and below λ (model 3)

5. CONCLUSION
As of recent, economists have shed light on to the contributions of the financial structure
components, particularly in regards to which system (bank system or market system) generates more
systemic risk and at what inflection point is this risk originates. However, despite the heightened level
of concern, very few studies have confronted this predicament and there is still very limited literature
which delves deep into the roots and means of measurement of systemic risks.
The central purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between financial structure and
systemic risk. Moreover, it aims to examine whether bank financing poses more of a risk than market
financing (amongst the selected eleven countries based in the MENA region) by measuring the
systemic risk through the credit rating of each country.

The findings of this study have indicated that there’s a relationship between financial
structure and systemic risk and this relation is a non-linear relationship. In depth, both separate and
pooled systems, the determinants of systemic risk contribution are found to be conditional on the
financial structure whether a country has a bank-based or market-based financial system. The
systemic risk contribution is generally larger for banks in a market-based system. The findings remain
robust to linearity of size, different lags, different exchange rate levels and risk measures. Further
research should be conducted in order to determine to what extent does the level of financial
development play in lowering the contribution of financial banking and increasing the level of market
financing in regards to systemic risk.
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